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Sexual Signalling in an Articial Population
When Does the Handicap Principle Work
Jason Noble
Center for Adaptive Behavior and Cognition
Max Planck Institute for Human Development
Lentzeallee  D Berlin Germany
Abstract Males may use sexual displays to signal their quality to fe
males the handicap principle provides a mechanism that could enforce
honesty in such cases	 Iwasa et al	 
 model the signalling of inherited
male quality and distinguish between three variants of the handicap prin
ciple pure epistasis conditional and revealing	 They argue that only the
second and third will work	 An evolutionary simulation is presented in
which all three variants function under certain conditions the assump
tions made by Iwasa et al	 are questioned	
  Sexual Signalling and the Handicap Principle
Sexual selection is a distinct subset of natural selection The idea is that evolution
is an exam with two papers in order to reproduce an animal must not only
survive to adulthood but in a sexual species it must gain mating opportunities
with members of the opposite sex One of Darwins insights was that selection for
sexual attractiveness and selection for survival could exert opposing evolutionary
pressures If for some reason females came to prefer males with elaborate and
costly ornaments such as the peacocks tail then sexual selection would push
towards yet more costly ornaments because males with longer tails experience
greater mating success At the same time natural selection would push for less
costly ones because males with longer tails are more vulnerable to predation
and less likely to survive to adulthood
An early explanation for extreme male ornament traits and female preferences
was that an initial random bias led to linkage between trait and preference
genes and that a runaway cycle of exaggeration then took place  Another
possibility more recently explored is that male ornaments function as 	indicator
mechanisms
 ie that they are used by males to signal their quality as mating
partners to females  This paper describes an evolutionary simulation based
on a populationgenetic model by Iwasa et al  that explores the conditions
under which this kind of sexual signalling could evolve
The suggestion that male ornaments are signals of matequality leads to
a problem in understanding how honest signalling could be maintained Why
should lowquality males ever honestly signal their condition when by doing so
they will make themselves unlikely to be chosen as mates Why wouldnt all
males produce the maximum advertisement regardless of their true qualityall
claiming in eect to be the most desirable Zahavis handicap principle provides
a possible mechanism by which a sexual signalling system could be kept honest
Zahavi  suggested that honesty could only be maintained in a communi
cation system if the signals were costly in some way He proposed the counter
intuitive idea that signallers sacrice some of their tness ie impose a handi
cap on themselves in order to produce signals that will be believed by receivers
In the sexual signalling case perhaps males are signalling their quality eg
vigour viability or territory size to females and are being rewarded with a
mating episode if they 	convince
 a female that they are of high quality Let
us suppose that the male signal is tail length Zahavi realized that if growing a
longer tail was cheap ie if it had little deleterious eect on male tness then
the signalling system would be vulnerable to blung all males would come to
have long tails and the female preference for longertailed males would no longer
be selected for But if growing a long tail was costly in tness terms the commu
nication system would not be corrupted by bluers lower quality males would
not be able to aord the necessary resources for growing a long tail Tail length
becomes an honest indicator of male quality because 	cheating
 is prohibitively
expensive Zahavi reasoned that only those communication systems in which the
signal happened to be costly would escape collapse due to blung Therefore
the stable systems found in nature are maintained by this mechanism
When the handicap principle was rst introduced it was generally not ac
cepted by theoretical biologists Populationgenetic models   seemed to show
that it could not be evolutionarily stable However the potential eectiveness
of the handicap principle has been validated by several mathematical models in
recent years foremost among these is a model by Grafen  This model estab
lishes that the handicap principle can work but species an important proviso
the unit cost of producing the signal must be greater for a low quality signaller
than for a high quality signaller In other words the tness cost of extending
ones tail by an extra centimetre must be higher for unhealthy or weak males
than for healthy strong ones
The handicap principle was maligned and misunderstood because Grafens
proviso about dierential unit costs was not clear from Zahavis original formu
lation and because several distinct interpretations of the principle are possible
Iwasa et al  attempted to cut through the confusion They detailed three vari
ant interpretations of the handicap principle listed below and suggested that
dierent ndings concerning the evolutionary stability of handicapped signalling
could be explained by the fact that some authors were modelling one version and
others another
   Pure Epistasis Handicap
In this variant a particular set of genes determine a males tail length and the
longer his tail the less likely he is to survive to reproductive age However his
survival is also determined by his quality higherquality males are more likely
to survive and for any given level of quality a male is more likely to survive
if he has a shorter tail Therefore the males that are most likely to die before
reaching reproductive age are those of low quality with long tails Observing the
adult population one would nd a correlation between the genes for quality and
tail length In technical terms epistatic selection has resulted in linkage dise
quilibrium in plainer language long tails are linked to high quality because all
the longtailed lowquality males died young In consequence a females prefer
ence for mating with longtailed adult males will mean that she is more likely
to achieve her goal of mating with a highquality male
  Conditional Handicap
A long tail still reduces a males chances of survival to reproductive age and
again survival is primarily determined by quality However the expression of
the gene for tail length is modied by quality males of lower quality will not
realize their full genetically specied tail length but will grow a proportionately
shorter tail It is assumed that only the highest quality males have the resources
to fully realize the tail length encoded in their genes Because the expression
of the taillength gene is qualitydependent observable tail length is correlated
with quality even before mortality has taken its toll A female preference for long
tails will therefore translate into a preference for highquality males
  Revealing handicap
The expressed tail length of males is determined directly by a gene as with
the pure epistasis handicap Survival to reproductive age depends on quality
modied by tail length as before However when the males reach reproductive
age and are competing to be selected by females only highquality males succeed
in maintaining their tails at their original genetically specied length Males of
lower quality are less well able to withstand the rigours of their environment and
their tails are shortened due to for example attacks by predators or parasites
 Low quality males reveal their status by tending to have shorter tails as
adults Females preferring to mate with longtailed males will thus mate with
higher quality males on average
 Modelling Sexual Signalling of Genetic Quality
Almost all of the models that have recently demonstrated the plausibility of the
handicap principle    have made a major simplifying assumption namely
that the underlying male quality of interest to females is environmentally deter
mined This could mean for example that males are advertising their level of
nutrition or the quality of the territory they possess This assumption misses the
interesting subset of cases in which males are believed to be informing females of
their genetic quality For example when sage grouse Centrocercus urophasianus
mate the males contribute only their sperm leaving all other aspects of the
project of raising ospring to females Nevertheless the females choose their
mate carefully on the basis of his ornaments display behaviour and central po
sition in the mating arena   If the males are advertising anything in this
case it must be their inherited genetic quality
It is not clear that an honest signalling equilibrium will exist for signals
of genetically determined quality A central problem is that there might not
be any residual variation in male quality and thus nothing to signal about If
the males were honestly advertising their quality and females were choosing
to mate with highquality males then after a few generations the males will
all be clustered around the optimum quality level As Maynard Smith  has
argued there should be no heritable variation remaining in tnessrelated traits
at equilibrium And yet female sage grouse pay the costs of choice eg time
costs and predation risk in order to choose the best male when the male will
contribute only his genes This is known as the paradox of the lek why arent
modern sage grouse males all maximally viable and thus equally attractive to
females The most likely answer is that mutation on tnessrelated traits is
negatively biased That is a single mutation event aecting the genes controlling
a tnessrelated trait is more likely than not to decrease the value of that trait
There is some empirical evidence for this at least one component of tness
is mildly heritable in Drosophila  this could only occur if mutational load
kept tnessrelated traits below their optimum value A similar conclusion was
reached in a review of evidence from many avian species 
Iwasa et al  constructed a populationgenetic model of the evolution of
costly male advertisements and female preferences they incorporated just such
a negative mutation bias on the viability trait Iwasa et als model purports
to show that honest signalling of genetically determined male quality can be
evolutionarily stable It is one of the very few models to deal with genetically
determined quality and provides the basis for the simulation described in this
paper
Iwasa et al reasoned that if females were prepared to pay a cost for their pref
erence then there must be information worth having in the expressed values of
the advertisement trait and it was therefore an honest indicator of quality Iwasa
et al derived three conditions for the existence of such a costlypreference equi
librium The rst was that mutation on the viability trait had to be negatively
biased Otherwise male viability levels would be clustered around the optimum
and the females would be in a position where random mating was just as likely
to result in a highviability partner as was a costly preference The second con
dition was that the genetic correlation between preference and viability had to
be greater than the product of the correlations between advertisement and pref
erence and between advertisement and viability Another way of putting this is
that there must be a link between preference and viability that does not come
about solely because of their joint relationship with the male advertisement trait
Finally Grafens proviso that the unit costs of signalling must be greater for
lowerquality signallers must also hold
Iwasa et als second equilibrium condition implies that whereas the condi
tional and revealing handicaps will work the pure epistasis handicap will not
In the conditional and revealing handicaps the viability trait directly aects the
expression of the males advertisementviability modies the expression of the
genes for growing an ornament of a particular size or in the case of the reveal
ing handicap low viability means that a large ornament cannot be successfully
maintained as an adult Valuable information for females concerning male via
bility has thus been built into the expressed male trait However in the pure
epistasis handicap the realized size of the male advertisement is only linked to
viability indirectly via dierential survival This means in turn that there is
no special link between the genes for preference and for viability
In order to keep their analysis tractable Iwasa et al made a number of
simplifying assumptions Most critical was the assumption that the genetic co
variances between male advertisement female preference and the viability trait
could all be treated as positive constants In the real world genetic covariances
are of course not constant but change as the population evolves over time even if
we suppose that the covariances might start out positive it is not clear that they
would remain so And it is more likely that the covariances in a plausible initial
population would be close to zero The problem highlights a weakness of the
populationgenetic approach despite the name there is in fact no population
which means that such important variables as genetic variances and covariances
must be input into the model as parameters rather than being measurements
that are made with respect to an evolving lineage The question as to whether
Iwasa et als conclusions would hold without assuming constant positive covari
ances  presents an excellent opportunity for an evolutionary simulation
 Description of the Model
The work reported here is an implementation of Iwasa et als  model as an
individualbased evolutionary simulation The population consists of sexual indi
viduals breeding in discrete nonoverlapping generations Individual organisms
have both a genotype and a phenotype the genotype consists of realvalued ge
netic parameters Each organism carries a gene for the male advertisement or
ornament trait t
gen
 the female preference trait p
gen
 and the general viability
trait v
gen
 An individuals phenotype consists of two real values either t
phen
or p
phen
 depending on sex and v
phen
 Genotypic and phenotypic parameters
are always real numbers between zero and one inclusive
  Development stage
At birth each individuals sex is chosen at random and its phenotypic trait val
ues are determined Normally each trait is read o the genome then a random
gaussian error term is added       and the resulting value stands
as the expressed trait The phenotypic male advertisement is normally read o
the genotypic value of t
gen
 However in the conditional and revealing handicaps
the males viability also inuences the expressed ornament sizethe phenotypic
viability is therefore calculated rst For the conditional handicap the adver
tisement size that would otherwise be expressed is reduced by an amount pro
portional to v
phen
 In other words t
phen
 t
gen
  v
phen
 Only males with the
maximum possible viability actually produce an advertisement that is as big as
their genotype species
 Survival stage
Some individuals survive to adult reproductive age and some die young
 
An
individuals basic probability of survival is equal to its phenotypic viability less
viable animals are less likely to survive However both male advertisements and
female preferences are costly and the cost of these characteristics is manifested
as a reduction in an individuals probability of survival according to the degree
of the traits phenotypic expression
Grafens proviso in which the unit costs of advertisement are lower for higher
quality signallers is enforced at this stage The basic probability of survival
v
phen
 is rst converted to an odds ratio and then scaled by   t
phen

C
adv

where C
adv
represents the cost of advertising If C
adv
  then there is no cost
at all to males for growing ornaments if t
phen
  then a male will pay no costs
regardless of how high C
adv
might be The scaled odds ratio is then converted
back to a probability value The result of all this manipulation is the following
expression for the probability of survival
p
survival

v
phen
 t
phen

C
adv
v
phen
 t
phen

C
adv
 v
phen
 
 
The scaling factor implements Grafens proviso because individuals with high
phenotypic viability will be best able to bear the costs of advertisement
The survival costs of female preference are assessed in exactly the same way
as the costs of the male trait p
phen
is simply substituted for t
phen
 and C
pref
for
C
adv
 in  Theories of handicap signalling generally do not require that female
preference should involve anything other than a simple cost that is independent
of viability however calculating female costs in the same way as male ones
allows the costs borne by each sex to be directly compared
 Mating stage
Surviving males and females are then able to breed females get to exercise their
preferences and males may experience the benets of their costly ornaments A
surviving female is randomly chosen and she is then presented with a 	lek
 of
eight males also selected at random With a probability equal to her preference
 
To prevent extinctions in the rare event that no males or no females survive to
adulthood one male or one female is randomly chosen for resurrection	
value p
phen


 she selects the male with the largest expressed advertisement trait
to mate with If she does not choose this male she chooses randomly from among
the eight males Thus highpreference females are likely to end up mating with
the male with the biggest ornament while zeropreference females will mate with
anyone The results of an earlier simulation  suggest that this method can
be eective in producing sexualselection eects and that eight is a reasonable
lek size Note that in Iwasa et als model female preferences were expressed
relative to the population mean of the male advertisement trait Having a model
in which individuals really exist allows us to avoid the dubious assumption that
females could know the population mean instead females choose a mate from
among those males they happen to come into contact with
The mate selection process continues until sucient ospring have been pro
duced to stock the next generation Crossover is simple newborn individuals
inherit the mean of their parents values for each realvalued genetic parameter
The mutation operator is a random gaussian       added to each
gene The allimportant negative mutation bias on viability is implemented by
subtracting  from whatever value a newborn individuals genetic viability
would otherwise have been If the mutated value of any trait would be less than
zero or greater than one it is truncated accordingly
 Results
The population consisted of  individuals and evolution proceeded in each run
for  generations Unless otherwise stated the results summarize a window
period over the last  generations and are averaged across  repeated runs
in each case The repeated runs in the various conditions were each performed
with a dierent seed for the pseudorandom number generator The simulations
have been conducted over a range of values for the advertising and preference
costs C
adv
and C
pref
 Earlier work  suggests that males will be prepared to
bear much higher costs in advertising than females will tolerate in expressing a
preference and the range of cost levels investigated reects this
  Pure Epistasis Handicap
Iwasa et al argue that the key evidence for sexual signalling is the willingness of
females to bear a costly preference Figure a shows that such preferences do
indeed evolve as long as both male and female costs are not excessive But are
females really gaining information about male quality from the advertisement
traits they observe Figure b shows the correlation for adult males between

Phenotypic preference values of less than 	 are in fact set equal to zero i	e	 females
with suciently low preference values mate randomly	 This is to avoid a situation
in which there is selection pressure for random mating but the mean value of p
never quite reaches zero due to recurrent mutation	 This would lead in turn to
a small female preference being manifested which might well be enough to push
males towards advertising when they would not otherwise have done so	
their expressed advertisement and their underlying quality It is clear that when
the cost of advertising is greater than zero but less than about  male ornament
size is modestly correlated with viability and therefore does carry information
Signalling of viability does not occur across the full range of cost values but it
certainly appears to be occurring in one region This contradicts Iwasa et als
claim that the honest advertisement of viability cannot be evolutionarily stable
given the pure epistasis handicap
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 Conditional Handicap
Figure a shows the mean values for female preference again females were
sometimes prepared to bear a cost in order to choose ornamented males It
is interesting to observe that although preference falls o somewhat as its cost
increases high preference values are most likely to evolve when the cost of adver
tising is low Figure b shows signicant correlations between expressed male
advertisement and underlying viability especially when advertising costs are low
The results therefore support Iwasa et als conclusion that an honestsignalling
equilibrium could be stable under the terms of the conditional handicap
 Revealing handicap
The results for the revealing handicap simulations were very similar to those for
the conditional handicap no additional graphs will be presented
 Discussion
Honest signalling of viability occurs in the pure epistasis handicap despite the
fact that Iwasa et al  claimed it could not In the conditional and revealing
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handicaps on the other hand the results presented here are in accordance with
Iwasa et als prediction that honest signalling could be evolutionarily stable
Iwasa et al intend their paper to clarify some of the controversies around the
handicap principle They argue that their ndings explain why some earlier
papers have concluded that the handicap principle can work while others have
concluded that it cannot dierent authors have tried to model dierent versions
of the idea Iwasa et als intended clarication is an admirable goal however
the results of the simulations presented here suggest that their conclusions must
be taken with a grain of salt Their assumption that genetic covariances could
safely be treated as positive constants does not appear to have been a reasonable
one
The conditional and revealing handicaps deserve closer scrutiny Consider
Figure b which shows the correlation between expressed advertisement and
viability in the conditional handicap case results for the revealing handicap were
similar The graph shows that the highest correlations were achieved when ad
vertising was costfree In the pure epistasis handicap by contrast we nd that
	talk is cheap
 in these cases Figure b shows that male advertisement was
never an indicator of quality when the cost of advertising was zero Why then
in the conditional and revealing handicap conditions can females trust the ad
vertisement levels of males who in theory can choose any advertisement level
they like because there is no cost involved The answer is that the males cannot
choose any advertisement level that they might like The stipulation that the
expression of the ornament trait is conditiondependent ie modied by via
bility builds in an informational link between advertisement and viability in a
rather uninteresting way It seems disingenuous of Iwasa et al to hold up the
existence of costly female preference and honest advertisements as a deep result
when the way in which the male trait is expressed itself enforces honesty Thus
we nd that the genetic correlation between the advertisement trait and viability
remains low in the conditional handicap case but the correlation between the
actual expressed advertisements and the underlying viability of adult males is
very much higher the conditiondependent expression of the ornament means
that females automatically get useful information about viability In addition
it is a little odd to claim that 	handicap
 signalling is occurring when the cost
free signals are the most reliable Considered closely Iwasa et als claims for
the conditional and revealing handicaps amount to little more than the uncon
troversial observation that females will attend to unfakeable information about
male quality
Finally it should be noted that all of the simulation results depend on
Grafens proviso that the unit costs of advertisement and in this case pref
erence as well should be lower for higherquality individuals Ones faith in the
simulation results must depend on ones faith in Grafens proviso as a realworld
condition
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